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COMMENT
To Litigate or Arbitrate?
No Matter-The Credit Card
Industry is Deciding For You
I. INTRODUCTION
Credit cards are pervasive in American society. At the end of 1997, there were
more active credit cards than people in the United States.' Credit cards complete
"more than $700 billion worth of purchases a year" and are currently the third most
common method of payment.' Disputes between consumer, merchant, credit card
issuer or any combination of the three are inevitable with that number of
transactions. This Comment will address a recent trend in credit card agreements,
that is, the insertion of mandatory binding arbitration clauses into credit card
agreements. This modification of cardholder agreements effectively prevents these
consumers from using the courts as a method of dispute resolution.
This Comment posits that consumers lose their legal protections in the credit
industry when arbitration policies are favored over consumer credit protection
policies. Part II will examine the language of credit card arbitration clauses
including a discussion of the circumstances under which a credit card holder might
bring a claim. Part III will discuss barriers to challenging the arbitration provisions.
Part IV will summarize how the courts have addressed mandatory arbitration clauses
in credit cards. Part V will examine traditional consumer credit protection laws,
specifically whether the Truth-in-Lending Act is able to protect consumers from
mandatory arbitration clauses. Finally, Part VI will address legal reform and
whether that is a viable solution.

II. CREDIT CARD ARBITRATION CLAUSES
Arbitration is a form of dispute resolution in which the parties agree to have a
"neutral decision-maker" adjudicate the dispute.' Typically, the proceeding is a
private affair and the "[a]rbitrators do not consider themselves bound by the doctrine
of precedent.", 4 Also, parties are normally allowed to mutually select an arbitrator. 5

1.

RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT

SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL

TRANSACTIONS:

CASES,

MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 107 (1999).

2. Id. The two most common methods of payment are cash and checks. Id.
3. LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS

215 (2d ed.

abr. 1998).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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Proponents of arbitration argue that it provides an alternative to costly litigation,
avoids the risk of huge verdicts and the potential publicity. 6 However, arbitration
entered into freely after a dispute has arisen is intuitively different than mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration clauses where the choice has been imposed prior to the
disagreement. Mandatory, binding pre-dispute arbitration clauses effectively prevent
a party from choosing civil litigation.
American Express, Discover, MBNA America Bank and Bank One have all
amended their credit card agreements to include arbitration provisions.7 They are not
alone; some department store cards, such as J.C. Penney,8 Best Buy, 9 and Sam's Club
Credit Card,'0 have added arbitration clauses. The following are examples of
arbitration clauses used in credit card agreements.
In September 1999, Discover Platinum's arbitration clause became effective."
As part of the new amendment to the Discover Platinum Cardmember Agreement,
a portion of the amendment states in bold, capital letters:
If either you or we elect arbitration, neither you nor we shall have the
right to litigate that claim in court or to have a jury trial on that claim.
Pre-hearing discovery rights and post-hearing appeal rights will be
limited. Neither you nor we shall be entitled to join or consolidate claims
in arbitration by or against other cardmembers with respect to other
accounts, or arbitrate any claims as a representative or member of a class
or in a private attorney general capacity. 2
Likewise, American Express amended its cardholder agreement to include a
similar arbitration provision. In capital letters it states:
If arbitration is chosen by any party with respect to a claim, neither you
nor we will have the right to litigate that claim in court or have a jury trial
on that claim, or to engage in pre-arbitration discovery except as provided
for in the NAF Code. Further, you will not have the right to participate
in a representative capacity or as a member of any class or claimants
pertaining to any claim subject to arbitration, except as set forth below,
the arbitrator's decision will be final and binding. Note that other rights

6. Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and FinancialInstitutions: A
Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 267, 271 (1995).
7. Copies of the arbitration amendments for American Express, Discover, and MBNA America Bank
are on file with the Journalof Dispute Resolution. A copy of the Bank One amendment can be found
in Bank One, N.A. v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819, 825 (S.D. Miss. 2001).
8. Arbitration Provision: Monogram Credit Card Bank of Georgia, J.C. Penney Co. (on file with the
Journalof Dispute Resolution).
9. Baron v. Best Buy, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1351 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
10. Sam's Club: Monogram Credit Card Bank of Georgia Credit Card Agreement Retail Instalment
[sic] Credit Agreement: Nonnegotiable Consumer Note (on file with the JournalofDispute Resolution).
11. Notice of Amendment to Discover Platinum Cardmember Agreement (on file with the Journal
of Dispute Resolution).
12. Id.
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that you would have if you went to court may also not be available in
arbitration. 3
These portions explain that arbitration procedures replace the more traditional
dispute resolution method of a judicial proceeding. Additionally, the language
"representative capacity or as a member of any class of claimants" refers to class
the clause excludes the right of card members to bring a class
actions; therefore,
14
action lawsuit.
MBNA America Bank also recently amended its card member agreement to
include an arbitration provision under a section titled "Litigation." Its provision
became effective on current cardholders, who did not reject the Arbitration Section,
on February 1, 2000."
Any claim or dispute ("Claim") by either you or us against the other, or
against the employees, agents or assigns of the other, arising from or
relating in any way to this Agreement or any prior Agreement or your
account (whether under a statute, in contract, tort or otherwise and
whether for money damages, penalties or declaratory or equitable relief),
including Claims regarding the applicability of this Arbitration Section
or the validity of the entire Agreement or any prior Agreement, shall be
resolved by binding arbitration. 6
MBNA allowed current cardholders to reject the arbitration provision if they gave
notice of their rejection in writing by January 25, 2000.17 Likewise, Discover gave
current cardholders the opportunity to reject the arbitration provision; however,
unlike MBNA, Discover cardmembers who notified Discover that they did not agree
to the arbitration provision would have their accounts closed. 8 Because of this
consequence, Discover Card holders had less incentive to reject the arbitration
provision (assuming they were satisfied with their card).
The arbitration provisions added to the credit card agreements are similar. The
Discover arbitration provision states that either the arbitration providers
JAMS/Endispute or the National Arbitration Forum will be used to arbitrate any
claim that falls within the provision. "9 Likewise, American Express 20 and the MBNA

13. F.Y.I.: A Summary of Changes to Agreements and Benefits for American Express Cardmembers,
Optima Cardmembers, and American Express Credit Cardmembers (on file with the JournalofDispute
Resolution).
14. Id. For a discussion of mandatory arbitration and class action suits see Jean R. Sternlight, As
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1 (2000). But see Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Excuse Me, But Who's the
Predator?,Bus. L. TODAY, May/June 1998, at 24.
15. Important Amendments to Your [MBNA] Credit Card Agreement (on file with the Journal of
Dispute Resolution).
16. Id.
17. Id.

18. Discover Cardmember Agreement, supra note 11.
19. Discover Cardmember Agreement, supra note 11.
20. American Express, supra note 13.
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America Bank2 arbitration provisions provide that the National Arbitration Forum
will be the arbitration provider used. The MBNA provision further states that "[i]f
the NAF is unable or unwilling to act as arbitrator," they may "substitute another
nationally recognized,
independent arbitration organization that uses a similar code
22
of procedure.
The arbitration providers named by the credit card companies tend to be either
the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service ("JAMS") or the National Arbitration
Forum ("NAF"). JAMS/Endispute, currently known as JAMS, is a private, for-profit
arbitration provider,2 3 which often employs retired judges as arbitrators (or neutrals
as they are referred to by the company).24 JAMS has offices located mainly on the
coasts, but also serving major interior cities, such as Chicago and Denver.2 5 The
NAF, known simply as the Forum, is also a for-profit company, 6 which has
arbitrators available in every state. 27 However, not all arbitration providers are for
profit. For example, the American Arbitration Association, founded in 1926, is
organized as a not-for-profit company.28
An arbitration provider named to
receive all disputes
from
one
company
may
have
an incentive to rule in favor of the
"repeat player."2" Professor Galanter defined "repeat players" as those that
"anticipate repeated litigation."30 He was commenting from a litigation perspective,
but his observations are also relevant in an arbitration context. He identified
advantages that the "repeat player" would have, such as learning from previous
transactions and the opportunity to develop a rapport with "institutional
incumbents."' A consumer may never, or rarely, use an arbitration provider. 2
Credit card companies, however, will use these arbitration providers repeatedly,33
which will allow them to apply what they have learned from previous arbitrations.
Additionally, on at least one occasion, the Forum has accommodated corporations

21. MBNA, supra note 15.
22. MBNA, supra note 15.
23. E-mail from Betty Tam, Director of Web Site Development, Judicial Arbitration and Mediation
Service ("JAMS"), to Johanna Harrington (Feb. 7,2001, 13:26 CST) (on file with the JournalofDispute
Resolution).
24. Richard C. Reuben, King of the Hill, CAL. LAW. Feb. 1994, at 55. Information regarding JAMS
is available on its website at http://www.jamsadr.com (last visited May 1, 2001).
25. JAMS, available at http://www.jamsadr.com/Iocations.asp.
26. E-mail from Edward Anderson, Managing Director, National Arbitration Forum ("NAF"), to
Johanna Harrington (Feb. 7, 2001, 15:03 CST) (on file with the Journalof Dispute Resolution).
27. NAF, available at http://www.arb-forum.com/index.htm (last visited May 1, 2001).
28. American Arbitration Association, available at http://www.adr.org (last visited May 1,2001).
29. The term "repeat player" is borrowed from Marc L. Galanter, Why the 'Haves'ComeOut Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REv. 95 (1974). One attorney experienced
in the JAMS arbitration forum stated: "Anytime you are paying someone by the hour to decide the rights
and liabilities of litigants, and that person is dependent for future business on maintaining good will with
those who will bring him business, you've got a system that is corrupt at its core." Quoted in Richard
C. Reuben, The DarkSide of ADR, CAL. LAW. Feb. 1994, at 53, 54.
30. Galanter, supra note 29, at 98.
31. Galanter, supra note 29, at 98-99.
32. By March 2000, only four consumers had filed a claim against First USA with the National
Arbitration Forum. Caroline E. Mayer, Win Some, Lose Rarely?; Arbitration Forum 's Rulings Called
One-Sided, WASH. POST, Mar. 1,2000, at El.
33. For example, since introducing its arbitration clause in 1998, First USA, which is owned by Bank
One, "has filed 51,622 claims against consumers with the [NAF]." Id.
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by "market[ing] its rules to corporations in part with the assurance that its rules do
not allow for class actions. 34 Because the MBNA America Bank provision allows
it to name another arbitration provider with similar rules, it will undoubtedly name
one who has similarly "marketed its rules to corporations. 35
Moreover, such repeated contact will allow credit card companies, whether
intentional or not, to develop a rapport with the individual arbitration employees and
the providers themselves. For example, discovery in a Texas class action suit against
First USA (owned by Bank One), "show[ed] that [First USA] paid the Forum $5.3
million between January 1998 and November 1999.,,36 Professor Galanter was
concerned about these differences and the effect of such differences on the ability
to change the legal system. 7 His concerns are even more relevant in arbitration
because much of the adjudication by arbitration occurs in private.
It begs the question to consider why a consumer might want to bring a suit
against her card issuer. Instinctively, disputes may arise between card issuer and
consumer for improper assessment of late fees, annual membership fees or the like.
Additionally, disputes may arise for improper assessment of finance charges.3"
These fees may be so nominal that arbitration may not be economically feasible for
the consumer. For example, for claims of less than $5,000 the NAF has a filing fee
of $49 and an administrative fee of $225.39
Discover, however, will not invoke arbitration if a cardmember brings an action
in small claims court and the claim is valued at less than $5,000.40 But, under
Discover's arbitration clause, if a party chooses to appeal the decision of the
arbitrator, the cost of such appeal "shall be borne by the appealing party regardless
of the outcome."'', This clause certainly provides a disincentive for Discover
cardholders to appeal, even if their appeal has merit. MBNA's arbitration provision
provides that "[i]n no event will you be required to reimburse us for any arbitration
filing, administrative or hearing fees in an amount greater than what your court costs
42
would have been if the Claim had been resolved in a state court with jurisdiction.,
These exceptions, however, are not enough for consumers to protect themselves

34. Stemlight, supra note 14, at 72.
35. Stemlight, supra note 14, at 72.
36. Stemlight, supra note 14, at 72.
37. Galanter, supra note 29, at 95-97.
38. A class action suit, Mangone v. First USA Bank and Bank One, was recently filed in the Southern
District of Illinois against First USA Bank and Bank One for allegedly failing to credit payments
promptly. Letter from First USA Settlement Claims Administrator, Portland, Or. (Nov. 21, 2000) (on
file with the Journal of Dispute Resolution).
39. Appendix C Fee Schedule, available at http://www.arb-forum.com/library/code.asp (last visited
May 1,2001). In comparison, the typical late payment fee is $29. The NAF will waive fees for indigent
parties. Rule 45 of the Code of Procedure, available at http://www.arb-forum-.com/library/
code/nafcode.pdf (last visited May 1,2001). However, Rule 45(d) states that if an individual has its fee
waived and then later recovers money, the "opposing Party shall deduct the unpaid fee from the amount
of the settlement or Award and pay the fee to the Forum." Id. One commentator noted that the waiver
of fees does not cover attorneys fees if the individual chooses to be represented in the arbitration
proceeding and it is unclear "whether the waiver would cover arbitrator salaries." Stemlight, supra note
14, at 82 n.322. Additionally, the term "indigent" is never defined; so ultimately, the decision to waive
fees is discretionary. Stemlight, supra note 14, at 82 n.322.
40. Discover Cardmember Agreement, supra note 11.
41. Discover Cardmember Agreement, supra note 11.
42. MBNA, supra note 15.
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against the arbitration provisions because they are not consistent between each card
issuer. Additionally, despite these precautions, consumers have still lost the right to
determine where they will seek relief.
Advocates of arbitration agreements in credit cards argue that as "consumer
lending" has become a "prime target[] for class action suits," arbitration agreements
are necessary to combat the "threats of costly and drawn-out litigation, runaway
juries, gargantuan punitive damages awards and adverse publicity. 43 Arbitration is
often cited as a faster and cheaper method of dispute resolution,44 and undoubtedly,
arbitration agreements limit lender liability. However, arbitration agreements should
not provide lenders with a "free pass."

III. CHALLENGING ARBITRATION CLAUSES
IN CREDIT CARD AGREEMENTS
Consumers have two key barriers in avoiding mandatory, binding arbitration
agreements: the Federal Arbitration Act and contract law.
A. The FederalArbitrationAct
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") 45 provides a basis for upholding arbitration
clauses. Under § 2 of the FAA, arbitration clauses are "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract., 46 Section 3 of the FAA provides that if a "party refuses to
arbitrate" according to the arbitration agreement, then the other party may obtain a
stay or obtain an order requiring the party to arbitrate as agreed.47 The FAA was
passed in 1925, in part, to force the courts to uphold arbitration agreements. 48
However, even after the FAA was passed, "courts often refused to enforce
agreements to arbitrate claims created by 'public interest' statutes in such areas as
employment discrimination, antitrust, and securities., 49 The Supreme Court, in
several decisions, 0 maintained that agreements to arbitrate are contractual, and
therefore, the "contract must be enforced," regardless of the area."
In interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act, the Supreme Court created the
"separability doctrine" in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing
Co.52 The doctrine maintains that the arbitration clause is a separate contract in and

43. Kaplinsky & Levin, supra note 14, at 24-25.
44. Mayer, supra note 32, at El.
45. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).

46. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
47. Budnitz, supra note 6, at 282.
48. Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionabilityafter Doctor'sAssociates, Inc. v. Casarotto,
31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1004 (1996). See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trs. of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989).
49. Ware, supra note 48, at 1004.
50. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
51. Ware, supra note 48, at 1005.
52. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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of itself, so a party challenging the contract cannot simultaneously attack the
arbitration clause.53 Therefore, on a motion to compel arbitration, the court may
only consider whether the arbitration clause is enforceable.54 Prima Paint was
followed by a series of cases in which the Supreme Court established a policy of
favoring arbitration.55
In Moses H. ConeMemorialHospitalv. Mercury ConstructionCorp.,s a dispute
arose between the contractor and the hospital when the contractor wanted to arbitrate
claims pursuant to the arbitration provision in their contract for increased overhead
caused by the hospital's delays.57 Although the contract was principally drafted by
the hospital,58 the hospital did not want to arbitrate any claims because they believed
the statute of limitations had tolled and that Mercury Construction had lost its right
to arbitrate because it failed "to make a timely demand for arbitration. 5 9 In Moses
H. Cone, the Court ruled that § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act established a "liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration." 6' Moreover, the Court affirmed the court of
appeals decision that the contractual dispute was arbitrable. 1
Moses H. Cone was expanded in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.62
Robert Gilmer brought an action against his employer under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA") after being terminated at the age of sixtytwo. 65 As part of his employment, he was required to register with the New York
Stock Exchange ("NYSE"). 64 The registration with the NYSE included an
arbitration provision requiring that any disputes regarding termination with his
employer would be resolved via arbitration. 65 The court of appeals reversed a district
court's decision that the claim was not arbitrable and the Supreme Court affirmed. 66
After the Supreme Court gave the "green light" for enforcing mandatory arbitration
clauses in Gilmer, lower courts have relied on this reasoning for enforcing such
clauses.
Moreover, in Southland Corp, v. Keating,67 the Court interpreted the FAA as
creating substantive rights as well as procedural rights,68 thereby avoiding
inconsistency regarding the validity of arbitration provisions between the state and

53. Ware, supra note 48, at 1009.
54. Anne Bradford, Note, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer ContractsofAdhesion: FairPlayor Trap
for the Weak and Unwary?, 21 J. CORP. L. 331,337-38 (1996).
55. Jeremy Senderowicz, Consumer Arbitration and Freedom of Contract: A Proposalto Facilitate
Consumers'InformedConsentto Arbitration Clausesin Form Contracts,32 COLOM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS.
275,279(1999).
56. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
57. Id. at 4-7.
58. Id. at 4.
59. Id. at 7.
60. Id. at 24.
61. Id. at 29.
62. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
63. Id. at 20.
64. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 196 (4th Cir. 1990).
65. Id.at 196.
66. Id.
67. 465 U.S. 1(1984).
68. Stephen Lamson, The Impact of the FederalArbitration Act and the McCarran-FergusonAct of
UninsuredMotorist Arbitration, 19 CONN. L. REv. 241, 245 (1987).
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federal courts."' The franchisees of 7-Eleven convenience stores brought suit against
Southland Corporation, the franchisor.70 Southland moved to enforce the arbitration
provision in the franchisee agreements. 7' The Supreme Court held that state law is
preempted by the FAA and that "state courts cannot apply state statutes that
invalidate arbitration agreements., 72 The Court elaborated on the Southlanddecision
in Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v. Dobson.73 In Allied-Bruce, the Court
reaffirmed the holding in Southland stating: "What States may not do is decide that
a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic
7 4 terms (price, service, credit), but not
fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause.
Through its interpretation of the FAA, the Supreme Court has strongly
supported arbitration. Moreover, this support has resulted in a pro-contract view.
Therefore, consumers cannot rely on the courts for help in determining that the
imposition of arbitration clauses in credit card agreements is unfair.
B. Contracts ofAdhesion
Consumers must rely on contract law because the Supreme Court has
maintained that only contractual defenses, such as duress, fraud or unconscionability
are available for invalidating an arbitration agreement."s Credit card agreements are
standard form contracts or contracts of adhesion. Contracts of adhesion are
"contracts presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 7 6 Professor Rakoff outlined
seven factors that are characteristic of contracts of adhesion: 77 (1) "[t]he document
whose legal validity is at issue is a printed form that contains many terms and clearly
purports to be a contract;" (2) "[t]he form has been drafted by, or on behalf of, one
party to the transaction;" (3) "[t]he drafting party participates in numerous
transactions of the type represented by the form and enters into these transactions as
a matter of routine;" (4) "[t]he form is presented to the adhering party with the
representation that, except perhaps for a few identified items (such as the price term),
the drafting party will enter into the transaction only on the terms contained in the
document;" (5) "[a]fter the parties have dickered over whatever terms are open to
bargaining, the document is signed by the adherent;" (6) "[t]he adhering party
enteres into few transactions of the type represented by the form-few, at least, in
comparison with the drafting party;" and (7) "[t]he principal obligation of the
adhering party in the transaction considered as a whole is the payment of money.""

69. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995) (citing Southland Corp.,
465 U.S. at 15-16.
70. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 3-4.
71. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 272.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 265.
74. Id. at 281.
75. Id
76. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts ofAdhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1173,
1173 (1983).
77. Id. at 1177.
78. Id.
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Contracts of adhesion have received special attention by legal scholars79 because
they do not follow the "normal" rules for contract formation, that is, there is no or
relatively no bargaining by the parties."0 The lack of bargaining has not resulted in
contracts of adhesion being considered something other than a contract. Rather,
courts have recognized that these type of contracts are "special."'" Despite the lack
of bargaining, the modem principle governing contracts of adhesion presumes that
they are enforceable. 82
The standard doctrines for contesting a contract, such as duress or fraud, are
available for adhesion contracts, but courts of equity have added the doctrine of
unconscionability, which was the basis for § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. 3 Courts differ on their approaches for analyzing unconscionability;"4
however, most jurisdictions follow a two-step approach: whether the contract was
procedurally and substantively unconscionable. 5 Procedural unconscionability deals
with the "fairness of the bargaining process" and substantive unconscionability deals
with the "fairness of the bargain" itself.8 6 For example, the California Supreme
Court recently reiterated its rule for determining unconscionability in adhesion
contracts in Armendariz et al., v. FoundationHealth PsychcareServices, Inc.8 7 The
court said that the procedural element of unconscionability focuses on "'oppression'
or 'surprise' due to unequal bargaining power" and the substantive element focuses
on "overly harsh" or "one-sided results."8 8 The court further stated that although
both elements are necessary for finding unconscionability, "they need not be present
in the same degree." 9 Although contract law may be used as a device to strike down
credit card agreements containing an arbitration agreement, it is presented as a
barrier because of the difficulty in proving duress, fraud or unconscionability.

IV. CASE LAW
Consumers have had mixed success in relying on the judicial system for relief
from credit card arbitration provisions. Although the Supreme Court has established
a policy of favoring arbitration, this has not prevented state and federal jurisdictions

79. See, e.g., Edward A. Dauer, Contracts of Adhesion in Light of the Bargain Hypothesis: An
Introduction, 5 AKRON L. REv. 1 (1972); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts
About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943).

Dauer, supra note 79, at 2.
Rakoff, supra note 76, at 1191.
Rakoff, supra note 76, at 1191.
Susan A. Fitzgibbon, Teaching UnconscionabilityThrough Agreements to Arbitrate Employment
Claims, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1401, 1405 (2000).
84. F. Paul Bland, Jr., To FightArbitrationAbuse, TheDevil is in theDetails,36 TRIAL31,32(2000).
See also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (defining
unconscionability as "an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with
contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party"). Id. at 449.
85. Fitzgibbon, supra note 83, at 1405.
86. Fitzgibbon, supra note 83, at 1405.
87. 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
88. Id. at 690 (quoting A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 486-87 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1982)).
89. Id.
80.
81.
82.
83.
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from re-examining arbitration provisions. Both state and federal courts have begun
to examine mandatory arbitration clauses in credit card holder agreements with
varying results.
A. Badie v. Bank ofAmerica
In Badie v. Bank ofAmerica, 90a group of Bank of America customers brought
suit.against their credit card issuer for changing the terms of their credit card
agre ements to include a dispute resolution provision.9 The credit card account
agreements, which the court noted were contracts of adhesion, contained a provision
that allowed Bank of America to change the terms of the agreement after the
agreements had been entered into.92
Bank of America, like other credit card issuers, changed the credit card terms
by informing their customers via a "bill stuffer." 93 A typical bill stuffer is a sheet of
paper included in the bill that would, for example, inform cardholders of changes in
interest rates on their accounts. The Bank of America bill stuffer containing the
dispute resolution provision stated in part: "If you or we request, any controversy
with us will be decided either by arbitration or reference. Controversies involving
one account, or two or more accounts with at least one common owner, will be
decided by arbitration under
the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American
94
Arbitration Association.
The appellate court said whether the dispute resolution clause was enforceable
depended upon the "meaning and scope of the change of terms provision."95
Furthermore, the court stated that the exercise of changing the terms must be made
under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 96 The court concluded
that Bank of America had not acted in an "'objectively reasonable"' manner, the
essence of good faith, "when it attempt[ed] to 'recapture' a forgone opportunity by
adding an entirely new term which has no bearing on any subject, issue, right, or
obligation addressed in the original contract and which was not within the reasonable
contemplation of the parties when the contract was entered into." 97
Additionally, the appellate court said "ordinary state law principles.., govern
the formation and interpretation of contracts" and therefore, a "'policy favoring
98
arbitration cannot displace the necessity for a voluntary agreement to arbitrate.'
Therefore, the appellate court held that the Bank of America arbitration provision
was unenforceable. 99

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

67 Cal. App. 4th 779 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
ld. at 783.
Id. at 785.
Id. at 783.
Id. at 785.
ld. at 791.
Id. at 796.
Id. at 796 (quoting Lazar v. Hertz Corp, 143 Cal. App. 3d 128, 141 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)).
Id. at 788 (quoting Victoria v. Superior Court, 710 P.2d 833, 834 (Cal. 1985)).
Id. at 807.
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B. Baron v. Best Buy

In Baron v. Best Buy' 00 a Best Buy credit card holder brought suit against Best
Buy for violating the Truth-in-Lending Act ("TILA") in its "Payment Maker
Protection Plan" ("Payment Plan")'0 ' The Payment Plan is an extra program offered
by Best Buy that provides "credit life, disability, property, and unemployment
insurance to customers who purchase Best Buy merchandise on the 'Best Buy
Card."" 0 2 The cardholder asserted that the Payment Plan violated TILA by failing
to contain the required disclosures.'0 3 After the cardholder filed suit, Best Buy
moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in its cardholder
agreement.104
The dispute resolution provision in the cardholder agreement stated in part:
Any claim, dispute, or controversy (whether in contract, tort, or
otherwise) arising from or relating to this Agreement or the relationships
which result from this Agreement, including the validity or enforceability
of this arbitration clause or any part thereof or the entire agreement
("Claim"), shall be resolved, upon the election of you or us, by binding
arbitration pursuant to this arbitration provision and the Code of
Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum.'0 5
Furthermore, the arbitration provision stated: "The parties acknowledge that they
had a right to litigate claims through a court, but that they prefer to have an election
to resolve any claims through arbitration, and that they hereby waive their rights to
litigate claims in a court upon election of arbitration by either party.'0°
The court did not find the that the NAF was a "neutral, inexpensive and efficient
forum to determine these claims as required by law."'0 7 Following a prior Eleventh
Circuit decision in Randolph v. Green Tree Financial,108 the court explained that the
clause was unenforceable because the clause provided that each party must pay for
their own attorney's fees, which is "contrary to the remedial purposes of TILA."' 0 9
Therefore, the court refused to grant Best Buy's"0 motion to compel arbitration."'

100. 79 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
101. Id. at 1351.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. id.
105. Id. at 1351-52.
106. Idat 1352.
107. Id. Critics of the decision have argued that it was "premature for the Court to have decided that
the NAF was biased and too expensive and inefficient before an arbitration before the NAF took place."
Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Anatomy of an Arbitration Clause: Drafting and Implementation
Issues Which Should Be Consideredby a Consumer Lender, 1172 PLI/Corp. 17, 47 (Apr. 2000).
108. 178 F.3d 1149 (11 th Cir. 1999).
109. 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1352.
110. Baron v. Best Buy Co.,75 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
111. Id. at 1371.
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However, Best Buy filed an appeal11 2and the district court stayed litigation until the
Eleventh Circuit made a decision.
C. Marsh v. First USA Bank
Other federal courts have also addressed the validity of arbitration provisions
in credit card agreements. Marsh v. FirstUSA Bank,"3 examined whether Defendant
First USA Bank could compel arbitration according to its Cardmember
Agreement."' Plaintiff cardholders brought suit against First USA Bank for
allegedly failing to promptly credit payments and for inaccurately assessing late
fees." 5 The plaintiffs raised four arguments: (1) they failed to receive notice of the
provision, (2) the provision was unconscionable, (3) arbitration would deny them the
right to a jury trial and rights under the Truth-in-Lending Act and (4) the NAF was
not a neutral provider." 6
Unlike the California Court ofAppeals in Badie, the United States District Court
of the Northern District of Texas found that the change of terms provision did not
exclude arbitration provisions, and therefore, the plaintiffs were bound by the
amendment to the Cardmember Agreement."' The court examined each of the
plaintiffs' arguments. The court found that circumstantial evidence was adequate in
proving that plaintiffs had received notice." 8 The court acknowledged that the
arbitration provision was offered in a "take-it-or-leave it" fashion; however, the court
said that the provision was not "so lopsided in Defendant's favor as to be oppressive
or prejudicial."' 9 Therefore, the contract was conscionable. 20 The court found the
plaintiffs' allegation that the arbitration clause would deny them the constitutional
right to a jury trial "meritless" because they had "assented to the terms of their
Cardmember Agreement" thereby agreeing to arbitrate. 2'
One of the benefits of TILA is the "right to proceed as a class and the
availability of injunctive relief." 22 In analyzing the plaintiffs' claim, the court
examined whether the arbitration provision "encompasses Plaintiffs' TILA claims"
and whether there was any other applicable "federal law, which would preclude
arbitration of TILA claims.' 23 The court ruled that TILA does not provide "a
statutory right to a class action" and that class actions are a procedural tool not a

112. The Supreme Court, granting certiorari, affirmed in part, and reversed in part. Green Tree Fin.
Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). On remand, the Eleventh Circuit held that arbitration provisions
are enforceable even if class action procedures are not available, thereby preventing consumers from
using rights granted under TILA. Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp, 2001 WL 245727 (11 th Cir. Mar.
13, 2001).
113. 103 F. Supp. 2d 909 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
114. Id. at 913.
115. Id. at 912.
116. Id. at 915.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 918.
119. Id. at 920.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 921.
122. Id. at 922.
123. Id.
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substantive right.'24 Furthermore, the court stated that simply because the plaintiffs
may not proceed as a class in arbitration, the substantive rights granted under TILA
are not denied. 25
Plaintiffs' last argument was an attack on the neutrality of the NAF. In support
of their argument, plaintiffs introduced statistics which indicated that First USA
Bank won in the majority of claims decided by the NAF.'26 The court, relying on the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Gilmer,found that the concerns raised by the plaintiffs
were "merely illusory."' 27 After examining the plaintiffs' claims, the court dismissed
the action and ordered that
arbitration be compelled "in accordance with the
' 28
Cardmember Agreement.'

V. CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION
A. The Truth-in-LendingAct
The Truth-in-Lending Act 12 9 originated as part of former President Lyndon
Johnson's Great Society plan providing "federal consumer protection."' 30 One
commentator explained that the passage of TILA was an effort to "level the playing
field" between consumers and "large corporations."'' TILA, the first five chapters
of the Federal Consumer Protection Act,'32 was implemented to "assure a meaningful
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily
the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and
to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card
practices.""'3 TILA standardized the way interest rates were disclosed and created
a definition of the term "finance charge" so that all34fees were included, thus,
accurately giving the consumer the true cost of credit. 1
In addition to requiring certain disclosures about credit terms, TILA also
regulates how credit cards may be issued, 1' regulates billing and sets forth the rights
of consumers to correct billing errors, 1 36 and requires the prompt crediting of

124. Marsh, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 923. The Third Circuit recently agreed in Johnson v. West Suburban
Bank, 225 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2000), and stated that class actions are procedural devices and not
substantive rights.
125. Id. at 924.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 925.
128. Id. at 926.
129. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1994).
130. John Roddy, Reversing Field: Is There A Trend Toward Abrogating Truth in Lending?, 772
PLI/Comm. 637, 639 (1998).
131. Id. at 639.
132. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r.
133. 15 U.S.C. § 1601.
134. Kathleen E. Keest, Whither Now? Truth in Lending in Transition-Again, 49 CONSUMER FIN.
L.Q. REP. 360, 361 (1995).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 1642 (prohibiting the issuing of unsolicited and unrequested credit cards, unless the
issuance of such card is for the renewal or substitution of an already accepted card).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1666.
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payments.' 37 And one of the more common provisions limits a cardholder's liability
for unauthorized charges to fifty dollars for each card lost or stolen. 38
B. TILA and the FAA: An "InherentConflict"139
The legislative history to TILA indicates that it was intended, in part, to protect
consumers against "predatory" industry practices." 0 Regarding TILA, President
Johnson stated: "the time has come to protect.., shoppers who seek credit." 4' The
legislature intended TILA to offer consumers protection from lenders. However,
when courts place arbitration over consumer credit protection policies, the consumer
loses congressional protection offered through TILA. TILA often serves as the42
backbone for consumers' arguments against mandatory arbitration provisions.
Under TILA, consumers are permitted to bring class action suits, 43 but usually may
not bring a class action suit in arbitration unless the parties have expressly agreed.'"
Moreover, several courts 45 have said that TILA only "contemplate[s]"
class actions
46
and does not create a substantive right to class actions. 1
In Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 4 7 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in
examining "whether claims under TILA... can be referred to arbitration under an
arbitration clause when a plaintiff seeks to bring a claim on behalf of multiple
claimants,"'' 48 discussed whether there was an "'inherent conflict' between
compelling arbitration and the TILA."'' 49 Terry Johnson borrowed $250 on a shortterm basis from the bank. In return for the loan, Johnson agreed to pay $338 in two
weeks, which amounted to a 917% Annual Percentage Rate. 50 The loan agreement
had a standard arbitration provision, which stated that "any claim, dispute, or
controversy" would be "resolved by binding arbitration by and under the Code of
Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum."'' The United States District Court
of Delaware had refused to enforce the arbitration clause because it would
"effectively strip ...TILA ...of [its] sting.' ' 2 The Third Circuit reversed. 5

137. 15 U.S.C. § 1666c. The regulations implementing TILA are found in Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R.
§§ 226.1-226.16 (2000), which provides more detail on the Act, such as billing error resolution, prompt
crediting of payments, and credit card solicitation.
138. 15 U.S.C. § 1643. Under § 1645, a business which issues 10 or more cards (of the same card
issuer) to employees may contract to change the provisions of § 1643, affirming that TILA was enacted
with consumers in mind and not businesses. 15 U.S.C. § 1645.
139. West Suburban, 225 F.3d at 369.
140. H.R. REP. No. 1040 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N 1962, 1963.
141. Id. at 1965.
142. See, e.g., Baron, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1350; Marsh, 103 F. Supp. 2d 909.
143. 15 U.S.C. § 1640.
144. Kaplinsky & Levin, supra note 14, at 26.
145. See, e.g., Marsh, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 923; West Suburban, 225 F.3d at 371.
146. West Suburban, 225 F.3d at 371.
147. Id. at 366.
148. Id. at 368.
149. Id. at 369.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Johnson v. Tele-Cash, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 264, 270 (D. Del. 1999).
153. West Suburban, 225 F.3d at 369, cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1081 (2001).
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The district court examined Johnson's argument that there was an "inherent
conflict" because "Congress expressly intended to preclude the arbitration of claims
arising under the TILA by explicitly allowing for the possibility of class relief under
the statute."' 5 4 However, the district court noted that "[t]here is nothing in either the
text or the legislative history of the TILA to indicate that Congress intended to allow
plaintiffs to avoid binding arbitration clauses.""' This is true; however, in the late
1960s Congress could not have anticipated that arbitration would become the
"mainstay" of lenders in the 1990s.15 6 Commentators have noted that "before the
1990s" consumers were "not subject to any regime of binding arbitration."' 57
After TILA was enacted, Congress amended it several times. One of these
amendments was a reaction to the court's refusal to certify class actions for fear that
"large class awards could overwhelm lending institutions."'58 As a result of the
court's refusal to certify class actions, Congress placed a cap on class action awards,
therefore, limiting a violator's liability in order"to protect small business firms from
catastrophic judgments."' 5 9 This cap was initially set at "$100,000 or 1 percent of
the net worth of the creditor" and was then later raised to $500,000. 160 The basis for
Johnson's argument of an "inherent conflict" came from the legislative history of the
proposed amendments.' 6' Congress' explanation for the increase was that the "chief
enforcement tool will continue to be private actions for actual damages and civil
penalties."'' 62 Furthermore, the Committee noted that "[t]he risk of any ceiling on
class action recoveries is that, if it is too low, it acts as a positive disincentive to the
bringing of such actions and
thus frustrates the enforcement policy for which class
63
actions are recognized.',
The Third Circuit explained that Johnson's argument was "unpersuasive"
because even if arbitration does not allow for class actions, plaintiffs still "retain the
full range of rights created by the TILA" in an arbitration setting. 64 The court cited
Rule 20(d) of the NAF, the arbitration provider named in the arbitration agreement,
which permits arbitrators or neutrals to "grant any remedy or relief allowed by

154. Tele-Cash, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 268.
155. Id. at 270 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628).
156. Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Consumer FinancialServices Arbitration: Last Year's
Trend Has Become This Year's Mainstay, 54 BUS. L. 1405, 1405 (1999). The authors observed that
"[d]uring 1998, consumer financial services companies continued to implement arbitration programs in
record numbers." Id. at 1427. Other commentators have observed that "[d]uring 1999, consumer
financial services companies, led by the issuers of the American Express and Discover cards, continued
to implement arbitration programs with their customers at a record pace." Stephen K. Huber & E.
Wendy Trachte-Huber, Top Ten Developments in Arbitration in the 1990s, Disp. RESOL. J., Jan. 2001,
at 24. The authors observed that "[tlhe 1990s was a period of extraordinary growth in the use of
arbitration in the United States." Id. at 24. They also noted that "arbitration provisions are found
everywhere in the world of consumer transactions." Id. at 30.
157. Huber & Trachte-Huber, supra note 156, at 30.
158. West Suburban, 225 F.3d at 371.
159. Id. at 372 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1429 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6148,
6153).
160. Id. at 372.
161. Id. at 372-73.
162. Id. at 372.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 373.
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applicable substantive law.' 65 The court acknowledged that if NAF modified its
rules to prevent the substantive rights under TILA from being exercised or if"[NAF]
otherwise presented barriers to a plaintiff's assertion of his or her rights," the case
would be different. 66 The court does not elaborate on what "barriers" would be.

VI. LEGAL REFORM
A. FederalLaw
To date, consumers have not been able to rely on the court system or consumer
credit protection laws for help in avoiding the imposition of mandatory, binding
arbitration provisions. As a result, at least two senators have taken steps to amend
the FAA. Senator Russell Feingold and his co-sponsor, Senator Patrick Leahy,
entered a bill to amend the FAA with respect to consumer credit transactions. In
February 2000, Senator Feingold of Wisconsin introduced Senate Bill 2117 titled the
"Consumer Credit Fair Dispute Resolution Act of 2000. ,167 This bill would amend
the FAA in part by inserting the following into § 2:
Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, a written provision in any
consumer credit contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of the contract,
or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, shall not be valid
or enforceable. Nothing in this section shall prohibit the enforcement of
any written agreement to settle by arbitration a controversy arising out of
a consumer credit contract, if such written agreement has been entered
into by the parties to the consumer credit contract after the controversy
has arisen. 168
The bill, if enacted, would allow credit card companies to arbitrate claims, but only
after the dispute has arisen. 169 Any attempt to impose arbitration on a consumer prior
to a dispute would be unenforceable. 7 °
7
A similar bill was introduced in the House by Representative Luis Guitierrez.1 1
The Consumer Fairness Act of 1999, House Bill 2258, would have prohibited the
unilateral imposition of arbitration clauses in consumer transactions."72 Currently,
these bills appear to be languishing in committees and it is unclear whether they will
eventually be passed.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 374 n.2.
Id.
S. 2117, 106th Cong. 2d Sess. (2000) (tabled).
Id.
Id.
Id.
H.R. 2258, 106th Cong. (1999) (tabled).
Id.
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The Federal Reserve Board is also beginning to scrutinize arbitration provisions,
not only in credit card agreements, but in "all consumer credit agreements."'' 73 One
problem it has with the use of arbitration provisions is that consumers often do not
know they have agreed to arbitration. 74 The arbitration clauses "may be buried in
a pile of documents," or "tacked onto the back of a sales receipt."' 7' Because of this,
the Federal Reserve Board has "suggested to Congress that it may want to consider
more effective disclosure when mandatory-arbitration clauses
legislation to require
76
are invoked."'
Rather than relying on the courts to provide "piecemeal" protection that varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, modifying the FAA may be the simplest way to
protect consumer interests. However, this change may not occur or will be too late
for consumers already facing arbitration. Congress held hearings for seven years
prior to the enactment of the Truth-in-Lending Act, 177 so modifying the FAA to be
in harmony with TILA may take almost a decade as well.
B. State Law
The Southland decision prevents states from adopting their own arbitration
legislation that is counter to the FAA. 17 Prior to the decision in Southland, states
that had adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act 179 also enacted legislation limiting the
use of arbitration provisions.8 0 However, because of the Supreme Court's decision
in Southland,the FAA preempts almost all of this legislation. '' Southland severely
limits the states' ability to protect their citizens from mandatory arbitration clauses.
Despite this restriction, states continue to introduce legislation that attempts to
limit arbitration agreements. California, for example, introduced a bill that is aimed
directly at arbitration agreements that are mandatory, binding, pre-dispute provisions
imposed in an adhesion contract.'82 This bill, if passed, would allow courts to vacate
an arbitration award if the award was caused by an arbitrator's legal or factual
error.8 3 Alabama is also taking steps to combat arbitration provisions directed at
consumers. In 2000, the Alabama Senate introduced a bill that would create a

173. Caroline E. Mayer, Hidden in Fine Print: 'You Can 't Sue Us'; Arbitration Clauses Block
Consumers From Taking Companies to Court, WASH. POST, May 22, 1999, at AI

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. H.R. REP. 1040 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962, 1964.
178. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281.
179. Lamson, supra note 68, at 249.
180. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-108-201 (Michie 1999) (prohibiting arbitration provisions in
tort, insurance contracts or employer/employee disputes); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401 (1999) (stating
arbitration agreements are not applicable in contracts of insurance, employer/employee contracts, and
in tort claims); Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.350 (2000) (invalidating arbitration agreements in contracts of
adhesion or insurance contracts).
181. Southland, 465 U.S. at 12. The states that have carved out specific exceptions to arbitration for
insurance contracts may be protected from FAA preemption by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011-1015 (1994). See Kaplinsky & Levin, supra note 107, at 19. See generallyLamson, supra note
68, at 246.
182. A.B. 1067, 2001-02 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001).
183. Id.
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commission whose principle purpose would be to protect and advise Alabama
consumers involved in arbitration.,84
Additionally, Texas introduced a bill which would mandate that leases and
contracts containing arbitration provisions include an explanatory paragraph
immediately above the signature line in type that is boldfaced, capitalized, and
underlined.'85 The paragraph would state: "By signing this contract you are
agreeing to have any issue arising under this contract decided by neutral arbitration
and you are giving up your right to a jury or court trial. The law does not require
that you submit to binding arbitration."' 8 6 This proposal is an attempt to prevent
arbitration provisions from being "hidden" in fine print. Although these bills may
never become law, state representatives appear to be reacting to growing consumer
concern regarding mandatory arbitration.

VII. CONCLUSION
As arbitration provisions in credit card agreements continue to grow, consumers
continue to lose the freedom to choose whether to litigate or arbitrate. Arbitration
provisions have been imposed on credit card holders via "bill stuffers" and the "takeit-or-leave it" terms of their cardholder agreements. Consumers have not been able
to rely on state regulation or the courts for protection because the courts and the
states are hampered by the Supreme Court's pro-arbitration doctrine. The Supreme
Court continues to place arbitration above consumer credit protection.
In light of the Supreme Court's policy favoring arbitration, consumers face an
uphill battle in disputes with their credit card companies. Because the Supreme
Court has failed to protect consumers, it is imperative that Congress amend the
Federal Arbitration Act to address the use of mandatory, binding, pre-dispute
arbitration provisions in consumer credit agreements. As suggested by Senator
Feingold and others, the amendment should declare that these type of arbitration
provisions in consumer credit agreements are unenforceable and invalid.
JOHANNA HARRINGTON

184. S.B. 525, 2000 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2000).
185. H.B. 2465, 77th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001).
186. Id.
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